Offshore wind has cut UK’s spending on imported fuels by at least £30bn
Analysis on 25th anniversary of commissioning of UK’s first offshore wind farm finds the technology is now main source of electricity from North Sea, overtaking gas

By Jess Ralston
info@eciu.netShare
Last updated:
The growth of offshore wind has reduced the UK’s spending on imported fuels by at least £30bn (in 2024 real prices) to-date, finds new analysis by the Energy and Climate Intelligence Unit (ECIU). [1]
Coming on the 25th anniversary of the commissioning of the UK’s first offshore wind farm at Blyth Harbour in Northumberland, [2] the analysis finds that, for the first time, UK offshore wind generation overtook the amount of electricity generated from domestically-produced gas in 2024, generating around 10% more power. [3]
This will become the norm, with the gap growing [4] as North Sea gas production continues its decline, irrespective of any new drilling [5], and as new offshore wind farms come online. [6]
Jess Ralston, Head of Energy at the Energy and Climate Intelligence Unit (ECIU), said:
“We’re seeing a symbolic shift in power in the North Sea as gas continues its decades-long decline while offshore wind takes top spot as the main source of British electricity for homes and businesses across the UK.
“As a mature basin, it’s an inevitability that North Sea gas output will continue to fall, so unless offshore wind expands, we’ll be ever more reliant on foreign gas imports and be ever more dependent on the international gas markets that sent bills haywire.
“The UK has done well to shift to clean, homegrown electricity, but it now needs to do the same for heating. Unless the UK gets on with installing electric heat pumps that can run off British renewables, the UK’s gas boilers will increasingly run on foreign gas as the North Sea runs out.”
Since late 2000, cumulative generation from offshore wind totalled over 400 terrawatt-hours (TWh) as of mid-2025, which otherwise would likely have been provided by a mixture of gas and coal. [7] Given the ongoing decline of UK gas and coal production, this extra consumption would have pushed up their imports by 10% and 4%, respectively, over the past 25 years. [8]
Of these avoided payments to overseas fossil fuel producers, an estimated £1bn (real prices, 2024 £) could have been paid to Russia for imports of LNG and coal, based on its historical share of imports, were it not for UK offshore wind power. [9]
25 years into their deployment, UK offshore wind farms currently produce almost 50TWh of electricity per year (17% of UK total generation). [10] UK nuclear power plants reached that same level of output 27 years after the first station at Calderhall opened in 1956. [11]
Notes to editors:
1.The analysis assumed that the absence of offshore wind would have meant more use of gas and coal power plants, in proportion with their actual generation levels in each year, based on data from DUKES 5.6 Electricity Fuel Use, Generation & Supply (DESNZ, 2025), and that this extra fuel would have been met by imports. The prices of gas and steam coal for power generation were taken from QEP 3.2.1 Prices of fuels purchased by major power producers (DESNZ, 2025), converted into 2024 real prices. The values from 2001 to 2024, inclusive, were £27bn for gas and £2bn for coal (real 2024 prices), and even conservative estimates for gas prices in 2025 (coal prices are now moot) give a total value of over £30bn for 25years of offshore wind generation.
2. E.ON decommissions Blyth offshore wind farm (E.ON, 2019)
3. The analysis used data from DUKES 4.1 Natural Gas Commodity Balance (DESNZ, 2025) and DUKES 5.6 Electricity Fuel Use, Generation & Supply (DESNZ, 2025), to calculate the following for each year from 2000 to 2024: the percentage share of UK gas demand that was used for power generation (e.g. 26% in 2024); the amount of UK gas demand that was met by UK production, assuming no exports (e.g. 344 TWh in 2024); and hence the maximum amount of UK gas that could have been used for UK power generation (e.g. 89 TWh in 2024). The analysis then used the implied efficiency of the gas power fleet in each year (e.g. 49% in 2024) to calculate the gas power generation that was fuelled by UK gas production (e.g. 44 TWh in 2024), and compared with this the generation from offshore wind farms (e.g. 49 TWh in 2024), showing the difference (e.g. 11% in 2024, rounded to 10%).
4. Annual data from DUKES is not yet available for 2025, but Q1 and Q2 were examined using data from Energy Trends 4.1 Natural Gas Supply & Consumption (DESNZ, 2025) and Energy Trends 5.1 Fuel used in Electricity Generation (DESNZ, 2025). This shows that the trend continued in Q1 and Q2 of 2025, with more electricity being generated by offshore wind than by gas power plants fuelled by UK gas, albeit by a smaller margin than in the same part of 2024, and it is not yet clear how the full-year results will come out. However, it can be expected that the result will be seen consistently within a year or two, as i) offshore wind capacity (and hence output) rises, reducing gas power generation, whilst simultaneously ii) UK gas production (and hence the share of gas power generation that it fuels) falls much faster than UK gas demand.
5. Analysis of projections suggest that UK gas production in 2030 without new licences would be almost 60% lower than in 2024, and 52% lower with new licences. Production Projections (NSTA, Nov 2025) – accessed Dec 2025
6. A list of upcoming offshore wind farms can be extracted from Renewable Energy Planning Database(DESNZ – updated 19 Nov 2025).
7. Generation from UK offshore wind was just over 400 TWh in the 24.5 years to the end of Q2 2025, and another c.25 TWh can be expected by the end of 2025. Given that wind power has been displacing gas and coal power over that time, it can be assumed that they would have made up the difference had there been no offshore wind farms.
8. As above, the analysis assumed that the absence of offshore wind would have meant more use of gas and coal power plants, in proportion with their actual generation levels in each year, based on data from DUKES 5.6 Electricity Fuel Use, Generation & Supply (DESNZ, 2025), and that this extra fuel would have been met by imports. The cumulative extra imports of gas and steam coal would have reached 10% and 4%, respectively, by the end of 2024. When it is available, the data for one more year (2025) will make little difference to these cumulative percentage figures.
9. The value of extra gas and coal that could have been imported from Russia in the absence of offshore wind generation was calculated by applying Russia’s share of actual UK gas and coal imports in each year, using data from Energy Trends 4.3 Natural Gas Imports (DESNZ, 2025) and Energy Trends 2.4 Coal Imports (DESNZ, 2025), and applying the price data from QEP 3.2.1 Prices of fuels purchased by major power producers (DESNZ, 2025).
10. Generation data for the first 24 years of offshore wind was taken from DUKES 5.6 Electricity Fuel Use, Generation & Supply (DESNZ, 2025), showing that offshore wind generated 49 TWh in 2024. For the 25thyear, data for January to November from Generation by fuel type, FUELHH (Elexon – accessed 1 Dec 2025) suggests that wind power overall (offshore and some onshore, combined) in 2025 is on course to exceed the 2024 level, which is likely to also be the case for offshore wind alone i.e. it will generated around 50 TWh in its 25th year. For the output of the nuclear power fleet from its start in 1956, data was taken from Historical electricity data: 1920 to 2024 (DESNZ, 2025), showing that it reached just under 50 TWh/yr in its 27th year.
11. Sellafield Limited (Office of Nuclear Regulation – accessed Dec 2025)
For more information or for interview requests:
George Smeeton, Head of Communications, ECIU, Tel: 07894 571 153, email: george.smeeton@eciu.net